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Trade Union Decline and What Next.
Is Germany a Special Case? **
Abstract – This paper commences with a survey of international trends in union membership, 
union density and collective bargaining, while focusing on the comparative position of trade 
unions in Germany. The author considers three hypotheses concerning the development of 
unionism in recent decades. The first one is that globalisation and structural change in the 
economy and labour market pull all countries towards a neo-liberal convergence of which 
union decline is one manifestation. The second predicts that resilient national institutions of 
collective bargaining and union-employer cooperation enable continued divergence in unioni-
zation levels across Western economies. The third one, which seems particularly relevant for 
Germany, states that feedback mechanisms from internal diversity among both employers and 
workers trigger processes of institutional destabilisation and decline from which both employ-
ers associations and unions suffer. In the final part of the paper the author gives a number of 
theoretical and empirical reasons why reversing union decline is very difficult and presents a 
major challenge for unions in Germany and elsewhere.  
Gewerkschaftlicher Niedergang und was dann? 
Ist Deutschland ein besonderer Fall? 
Zusammenfassung – Dieser Beitrag beginnt mit einem Überblick über internationale Trends 
bei gewerkschaftlichen Mitgliederzahlen, Organisationsgraden und kollektiven Verhandlungen, 
wobei ein besonderes Augenmerk auf Deutschland gelegt wird. Der Autor diskutiert dann drei 
Hypothesen zur gewerkschaftlichen Entwicklung in den letzten Jahrzehnten. Die erste ist, dass 
Globalisierung und Strukturwandel alle Länder in Richtung einer neo-liberalen Konvergenz bee-
influssen, die sich auch im Niedergang der Gewerkschaften manifestiert. Die zweite Hypothese 
postuliert, dass elastische nationale Institutionen kollektiver Verhandlungen und Gewerkschaft-
Arbeitgeber-Kooperationen weiterhin divergente Organisationsgrade in westlichen Ländern 
ermöglichen. Die dritte Hypothese, die für Deutschland besonders relevant zu sein scheint, geht 
davon aus, dass Rückkopplungsmechanismen aus internen Unterschieden auf Arbeitgeber- und 
Arbeitnehmerseite Prozesse der institutionellen Destabilisierung und des Niedergangs auslösen, 
unter denen Arbeitgeberverbände wie Gewerkschaften leiden. Im letzten Teil des Beitrags wird 
eine Reihe von theoretischen und empirischen Gründen angesprochen, weshalb die Umkehrung 
des gewerkschaftlichen Mitgliederrückgangs sehr schwierig ist und eine große Herausforderung 
für die Gewerkschaften in Deutschland und anderswo darstellt. 
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Introduction
Are Germany’s trade unions a special case? In recent times, there is more uncertainty 
about the future of German unions and industrial relations than at any time since the 
foundation of the Federal Republic. Union membership is declining and bargaining 
coverage has eroded. Employer pressure and political voices calling for the withdrawal 
of legal support for the current model of union-management relations have increased. 
With union density approaching a critical boundary of twenty percent of the employed 
workforce, Addison/Schnabel/Wagner (2007) pose the question whether that will be 
enough to sustain corporatist industrial relations. The decline in union representation 
decreases the industrial power, public legitimacy and political clout that unions need to 
act as the collective custodians of employee rights in the political and industrial arena. 
Given the importance of the German economy in Europe and its ‘model’ character 
for other ‘co-ordinated market economies’ (Hall/ Soskice 2001), the future of German 
labour relations and trade unions has wider implications.
I start this paper with a survey of international trends in union membership, un-
ion density and collective bargaining. Taking my inspiration from Thelen/van 
Wijnbergen (2003), I consider in the next section three hypotheses regarding the 
explanation of trends in unionization: (1) globalisation and structural change in the 
economy and labour market pull all countries towards a neo-liberal convergence of 
which union decline is one manifestation; (2) resilient national institutions of collective 
bargaining and union-employer cooperation enable continued divergence in unioniza-
tion levels across Western economies; and (3) feedback mechanisms from internal 
diversity among employers and workers trigger processes of institutional destabilisa-
tion and decline of representation in employers’ associations and trade unions, and 
these mechanism are particularly albeit not exclusively present in the German case. 
The third section considers the possibilities of reversing decline. 
Union decline – Germany compared 
Membership trends 
Germany’s trade unions are losing members and represent a declining share of the 
labour market (Beck/Fitzenberger 2004; Ebbinghaus 2003; Fichter 1997; Schna-
bel/Wagner 2007). The decline – nearly four and a half million members1 in the ten 
years between 1991 and 2001, an average of 4.5 percent per year – is unprecedented in 
post-war German history. In the thirty year between 1950 and 1980 there were only 
four years with membership decline, the largest between 1966 and 1968 averaging just 
over 100,00 members or 1.3 percent per year (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 324). In the 
1980s growth stopped, but in the fifteen years since 1991 aggregate membership, 
counting all unions together, declined every single year.2 A continuous decline of this 
                                                          
1  All membership figures in his article refer to members in dependent employment, disre-
garding those who have retired from the labour market, are unemployed (though a small 
number might be included) or self-employed. For methods of calculation and national 
data-sources I refer to Visser, 2006.
2  Union decline continued after 2001 (see Table 1), but in 2004 and 2005, according to 
figures of the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB), the pace appears to have 
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magnitude over such a span of time is rare. The only examples are British unions be-
tween 1979 and 1998, French unions between 1976 and 1989, Austrian unions since 
1990, Swiss unions since 1992, and Japanese unions since 1994 (Nakamura 2007).
After 1980 union decline became after 1980 a worldwide phenomenon, affecting 
nearly all industrialised nations and most developing countries (Visser 1991; 2003). Of 
the G7, only in Canada did unions weather the storm relatively well, especially when 
compared with developments south of the border. Of the 24 OECD countries in 
Table 1, absolute membership numbers are now lower than in 1980 in all but eight 
countries: Canada, South Korea, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
and Norway. In many countries – foremost the USA, the UK, Australia, New Zea-
land, France, Japan, but also Austria and Switzerland, as well as the four transition 
economies in Table 13 – union membership decline was very significant and continued 
one or more decades without signs of reversal.
Remarkable for the German case is that union decline started very late. The hae-
morrhage started only after the incorporation of the four million union members of 
the former German Democratic Republic. Before 1990 there was a small rise in union 
membership even in manufacturing, at that time still representing more than fifty 
percent of total membership (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000: 327). Developments in 
German unions during the 1980s were similar to those in Japan, where union mem-
bership levels did not start to fall until 1994 (Nakamura 2007), and Sweden, where 
1991-92 signalled the end of fifty years of union expansion. This stood in sharp con-
trast to the decline in union membership, particularly concentrated in the 1980s and 
among workers in manufacturing, in the US (-17%), New Zealand (-16%), the UK (-
25%), France (-40%), Italy (-18%) and the Netherlands (-11%). 
Union density trends 
Union density rates, or membership relative to the size of the labour force,4 facilitate 
the comparison over time and across countries. Again, our first observation (from the 
right hand panel of Table 1) is that until 1980 unionisation trends were upwards in 
most countries, with notable exceptions for the US (where union density peaked in 
1953) and Japan (where union density started its downward movement after 1974).
                                                          
slowed (“Union membership decline slows down”, EIRO,  
http://www.eurofound/2006/04/articles/de0604039i.html, accessed 14.12.2006. It 
should be mentioned that not all union federations are equally affected. There was some 
union growth for the German Union of Civil Servant’s (DBB) and the small Christian 
Federation (CGB). 
3  For the four former Communist countries in Table 1, Instead of 1980 1990/91 is used as 
yardstick, it being the first year when credible estimates of union membership were avai-
lable.
4  All density or unionization rates in this article express net or employed union members-
hip, excluding the self-employed, as a proportion of wage earners and salaried employees 
(including civil servants) in employment, as published in OECD Labour Force Statistics. 
The exclusion of the self-employed has only a small effect, since unions hardly organize 
independent workers like the Ich-AG in Germany (Visser 2006). 
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Table 1:  Union members in employment and net density rates, 1980-2003 
U
n
io
n
 m
em
b
er
s 
in
 d
ep
en
d
en
t 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
(t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s)
 
ch
an
g
e 
in
 p
er
ce
n
ta
g
es
 
N
et
 u
n
io
n
 d
en
si
ty
 r
at
es
 
E
S
S
**
 
19
70
19
80
19
90
20
00
20
03
19
70
s
19
80
s
19
90
s
19
70
 
19
80
 
19
90
 
20
00
 
20
03
 
 
20
02
-2
00
4 
E
U
-1
5
33
.9
40
 
43
.6
64
39
.2
62
36
.3
82
35
.3
75
28
,5
-1
0,
1
-7
,3
38
 
40
 
33
 
27
 
26
 
 
. .
 
U
S
A
19
.3
81
 
20
.0
95
16
.7
40
16
.2
58
15
.7
76
3,
7
-1
6,
7
-2
,9
29
* 
23
* 
16
* 
13
* 
13
* 
 
. .
 
C
an
ad
a
2.
21
1 
3.
48
7
3.
89
8
3.
74
0
4.
10
0
57
,7
11
,8
-4
,1
31
 
35
* 
33
* 
28
* 
28
* 
 
. .
 
A
us
tr
al
ia
2.
05
2 
2.
56
8a
2.
66
0
1.
90
2
1.
86
7
29
,9
3,
6
-2
8,
3
44
 
50
*a
41
* 
25
* 
23
* 
 
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
52
9 
71
4
60
3
31
9
33
5
35
,0
-1
5,
5
-4
7,
3
52
 
69
 
51
 
23
 
22
 
 
Ja
pa
n
11
.6
05
 
12
.3
69
12
.2
65
11
.5
39
10
.5
31
6,
6
-0
,8
-5
,9
35
 
31
 
25
 
22
 
20
 
 
. .
 
S
ou
th
 K
or
ea
47
3 
94
8
1.
93
2
1.
48
1
1.
60
6
10
0,
3
10
3,
6
-2
3,
4
13
 
15
 
18
 
11
 
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
es
t G
er
m
an
y
6.
96
6 
8.
15
4
8.
01
4
6.
49
3d
. .
17
,1
-1
,7
-1
9,
0
32
 
35
 
31
/2
9*
c
25
*
20
*g
. .
 
E
as
t G
er
m
an
y
 
4.
15
0b
2.
04
6d
. .
-5
0,
7
 
 
../
40
*c
19
* 
18
*g
. .
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
11
.9
69
b
8.
06
7
7.
12
0
-3
2,
6
 
 
36
*a
25
* 
23
* 
 
20
 
U
K
10
.0
68
 
11
.8
52
8.
95
2
6.
63
6
6.
52
4
15
,7
-2
4,
5
-2
5,
9
45
 
51
 
39
* 
27
* 
26
* 
 
27
 
Ita
ly
4.
73
6 
7.
18
9
5.
87
2
5.
21
2
5.
32
7
51
,8
-1
8,
3
-1
1,
2
37
 
50
 
39
 
35
 
34
 
 
28
 
F
ra
nc
e
3.
45
8 
3.
28
2
1.
96
8
1.
78
0
1.
83
0
-5
,1
-4
0,
0
-9
,6
22
 
18
 
10
 
8*
 
8*
 
 
12
 
S
pa
in
 
1.
03
0
1.
19
3
1.
96
4
2.
19
7
15
,8
64
,6
 
13
 
13
 
16
 
16
 
 
16
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
w
ed
en
2.
23
5 
3.
03
9
3.
26
0
2.
95
1
2.
96
4
30
,7
7,
3
-9
,5
68
 
78
 
81
 
79
* 
78
* 
 
79
 
F
in
la
nd
82
8 
1.
33
2
1.
52
7
1.
50
4
1.
49
5
60
,8
14
,6
-1
,5
51
 
69
 
73
 
75
* 
73
* 
 
76
 
N
or
w
ay
68
3 
93
8
1.
03
4
1.
12
9
1.
12
9
37
,2
10
,3
7,
3
57
 
58
 
59
 
54
 
55
 
 
60
 
D
en
m
ar
k
1,
10
8 
1.
60
5
1.
75
6
1.
80
4
1.
71
0
44
,8
9,
4
2,
7
60
 
79
 
75
 
73
 
70
 
 
81
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B
el
gi
um
1.
23
1 
1.
65
1
1.
64
6
1.
70
5
1.
59
0
34
,1
-0
,3
3,
6
42
 
54
 
54
 
51
 
47
 
 
47
 
A
us
tr
ia
1.
35
5 
1.
44
4
1.
37
5
1.
18
7
1.
12
9
6,
5
-4
,8
-1
3,
7
63
 
57
 
47
 
37
 
34
 
 
33
 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
1.
43
0 
1.
51
7
1.
34
8
1.
57
8
1.
57
5
6,
1
-1
1,
1
17
,1
37
 
35
 
27
*^
26
*^
24
*^
 
28
 
S
w
itz
er
la
nd
76
0 
85
3
82
0
68
7
64
3d
12
,1
-3
,9
-1
6,
2
29
 
31
 
24
 
19
 
18
e
 
18
 
Ir
el
an
d
38
2 
49
1
44
2
50
6
52
1
28
,6
-1
0,
0
14
,3
53
 
57
 
51
 
38
* 
35
* 
 
39
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
ol
an
d
 
6.
30
0
2.
10
0
1.
88
0
-6
6,
7
 
 
53
 
20
 
18
 
 
19
 
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
.
 
3.
82
0
1.
07
5
86
6
-7
1,
9
 
 
79
 
27
 
22
 
 
20
 
S
lo
va
ki
a
 
1.
92
0
70
0
59
0
-6
3,
5
 
 
79
 
34
 
30
 
 
. .
 
H
un
ga
ry
 
3.
00
0
65
0
62
0
-7
8,
3
 
 
63
 
20
 
19
 
 
18
 
a =
19
82
b =
19
91
; c
=
19
92
; d
=
19
97
; e
=
20
01
; f
=
20
02
g =
20
04
. ^
 r
ec
al
cu
la
te
d 
w
ith
 n
at
io
na
l d
at
a 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
jo
bs
 u
nd
er
 1
1 
ho
ur
s 
pe
r 
w
ee
k.
 
S
ou
rc
es
: J
. V
is
se
r 
(f
or
 m
et
ho
ds
 a
nd
 n
at
io
na
l s
ou
rc
es
: V
is
se
r 
20
06
),
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 d
at
a 
fr
om
 S
ch
na
be
l/W
ag
ne
r 
(2
00
3,
 2
00
7)
 fo
r 
de
ns
ity
 r
at
es
 o
f W
es
te
rn
 a
nd
 E
as
te
rn
 G
er
m
an
y 
in
 1
99
2,
 
20
00
, a
nd
 2
00
4,
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
A
LL
B
U
S
 s
ur
ve
y,
 a
nd
 fr
om
 G
uy
 v
an
 G
uy
s 
(H
og
er
 In
st
itu
ut
 v
oo
r 
A
rb
ei
d,
 C
at
ho
lic
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f L
ou
va
in
) 
fo
r 
20
03
 d
en
si
ty
 e
st
im
at
es
 fo
r 
B
el
gi
um
, H
un
ga
ry
, t
he
 
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
 a
nd
 S
lo
va
ki
a.
 *
=
 e
st
im
at
ed
 fr
om
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 o
r 
la
bo
ur
 fo
rc
e 
su
rv
ey
s;
 *
*=
es
tim
at
ed
 b
y 
au
th
or
 fr
om
 2
00
2/
3 
an
d 
20
04
/5
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
S
oc
ia
l S
ur
ve
ys
 (
w
ith
ou
t s
el
f-
em
pl
oy
ed
 
an
d 
re
tir
ed
),
 h
ttp
://
w
w
w
.e
ur
op
ea
ns
oc
ia
ls
ur
ve
y.
or
g.
 T
he
 P
ea
rs
on
 c
or
re
la
tio
n 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
20
03
 n
et
 d
en
si
ty
 r
at
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
E
S
S
 e
st
im
at
es
 fo
r 
20
02
-2
00
4 
is
 0
.9
77
.
Industrielle Beziehungen, 14. Jg., Heft 2, 2007   101 
Both the USA and Japan are examples of enterprise unionism and company bargain-
ing, caught up with the difficulty to expand beyond their strongholds in some public 
services and large companies in mining and manufacturing. Early trends of union 
decline were also visible in Austria, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands. After 
1980 there were few countries where unions continued to grow after 1980 (Sweden, 
Finland and, coming from far behind, Spain and Korea) or maintained their position 
(Belgium, Norway, Canada). With only a four-point drop in density, Germany’s trade 
unions seemed to do comparatively well.
If the 1980s were bad for the unions in most countries, the 1990s were not much 
better. The decline in unionization rates continued in all but two countries (Spain and 
Finland) and there were particularly large decreases in density in the UK, Australia, 
New Zealand, Ireland, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, as well as in the four post-
communist countries (Table 1). About each of these cases a different story can be 
told: even while gaining more members, Irish unions, like those in the Netherlands 
and Switzerland, were unable to keep pace with the formidable expansion of employ-
ment in the new service economy; British unions, like those in the US, France and 
perhaps more surprisingly Austria, found no recipe to halt or reverse the downward 
slope begun a decade or more earlier; unions in New Zealand and Australia were ad-
versely affected by the overhaul of legislation ending national agreements and closed 
shop membership awards. Germany’s trade unions now truly entered their crisis years: 
in the Eastern Länder unionization levels halved between 1992 and 2000; in the West-
ern Länder they dropped to 25 percent, some ten points lower than what had been 
customary in post-war Germany.
The precipitous fall in unionization in Eastern Germany is rather similar to what 
happened to the trade unions in Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hun-
gary. Whatever big mistakes German unions made by incorporating the GDR union 
organizations without first reorganizing them (see Fichter 1997; 1998), the makeover 
of trade unions that had been charged with social policy tasks in companies and 
counted on quasi-compulsory membership, into voluntary organizations lacking ‘se-
lective goods’ was never going to be easy. I do not know of one successful example. 
Portugal, Brazil and Poland each offer interesting case material for the study of such 
transitions away from ‘corporatist’ or ‘communist’ quasi-compulsory union member-
ship. In each case we observe brief successes and mobilisation waves when new un-
ions and organizers offered strong but transient ‘identity incentives’ (Pizzorno 1981) 
in the struggle for democracy. 
Levels of unionization 
Regarding the level of unionization, Europe’s North is exceptional with 55 (Norway) 
to 78 (Sweden) percent of the employed wage and salary earners joining the unions.5
                                                          
5  The estimates based on the European Social Survey (averaged over the two waves of 
2002/3 and 2004/5) suggest slightly higher density rates. The correlation between the two 
sources for the 17 European countries with comparable data (see Table 1, right hand pa-
nel) is very high (.977). Especially in the case of high-density countries, i.e. in the Nordic 
countries, do surveys indicate higher unionization levels in comparison with administrati-
ve data. Further research would have to establish whether the reluctance to declare non-
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In recent years unions in ‘high density’ countries are affected by decline as well, as 
were other ‘high density’ countries (Austria, Ireland, the UK, and outside Europe, 
Australia and New Zealand) much earlier. At the other end of the scale we find Fran-
ce, but that is no news. For most of its history the French union movement got by 
with very low membership numbers, poor finances and a strong reliance on public 
support and state aid. Not so far away - with union density levels between 10 and 25 
percent, or 8-20 percent if we consider the private sector only – we find a large group 
of countries with quite different systems of industrial relations including the US, the 
UK, Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Japan, Germany, and all but two (Slovenia 
and Slovakia) of the ECE countries. In sum, with the exception of Northern Europe, 
trade union members are the minority, and often a rather small one.
Bargaining or union coverage 
In addition to trade union density, it has become common to consider bargaining 
coverage as a key measure of the influence of trade unions in labour markets (Flana-
gan 1999; OECD 2004). Defined as the share of wage and salary earners whose terms 
of employment are affected by collective agreements negotiated between unions and 
employers, bargaining coverage indicates the capacity of trade unions to commit 
employers to the joint regulation of employment.
Averaged over the fifteen economies of the European Union before the enlarge-
ment of May 2004, collective agreements cover 70 percent of all employees (EC 
2004). Bargaining coverage in the United States has decreased to less than 14 percent, 
in Japan to 24, in Canada to 32, in Australia to 50 percent (Visser 2006: 11). In China 
and India there is no such bargaining or joint regulation outside a minute segment of 
state employment (ILO 1998). 
With an estimated coverage rate of 63 percent (68 per cent in the Western and 53 
per cent in the Eastern Länder6), Germany lies below the average for Western Europe. 
Only Swiss (45 percent) and British (35 percent) workers are less covered. Moreover, 
the German decline in coverage – ten to fifteen points in just as many years - contrasts 
sharply with the stability observed elsewhere in Western Europe. In fact, in many 
countries, including Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, but also in 
France, Italy, Spain and Portugal more sectors of the economy and more employees 
are now affected by union-management negotiations or state-imposed collective wage 
regulations than in the 1970s (OECD 2004; EC 2004). Germany seems to have gone 
different ways. There is evidence that bargaining coverage in Western Germany has 
decreased even in core sectors like metal manufacturing (Hassel, forthcoming), with 
an increasing number of small and medium-sized firms choosing to stay outside the 
sectoral agreement, though many follow the agreement in some aspects voluntarily, 
without being formally bound by it.
                                                          
membership in face-to-face interviews in a context where membership evidently is the so-
cial norm, produces an upward estimation bias. A bias in the opposite direction might 
lead to erroneous predictions in low-density countries. 
6  According to the figures based on the IAB enterprise survey of 2004, analyzed by Ell-
guth/Kohaut (2005). 
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In East Central Europe (ECE) free collective bargaining in its current format was 
unknown before 1989. Rather than the erosion of existing practices, unions in these 
countries face the difficulty of establishing collective bargaining outside a handful of 
large firms and the public sector. In ECE, collective bargaining has until now only 
affected a minority of firms and employees – some 30-40 per cent of those in em-
ployment, less if we consider only the private sector (Kohl/Platzer 2003; EC 2004). 
Unable to build strong and autonomous employers’ organizations, with weak and 
divided unions, and an economy fragmented between struggling state enterprises, 
foreign-owned firms and the myriad world of small and medium-sized enterprises, the 
Western European model of sectoral collective bargaining never stood much of a 
change in ECE. Fifteen years into transition towards a market economy, it is clear that 
wages in the private sector are decided at company level and that these decisions are 
often taken unilaterally by management, albeit with some consideration of the level 
and changes of the minimum wage decided by the government, sometimes after con-
sultation with central employers’ and union organisations. Sectoral collective bargain-
ing is mostly restricted to the state sector. In most small and many large foreign-
owned companies there is no collective bargaining or union representation. We may 
conclude that in this aspect East meets West, with ECE industrial resembling Anglo-
American realities rather than continental European ones.
Explaining trends in union representation and bargaining 
Convergence toward decline or continued divergence? 
The thesis that the decline of American unions, begun in the 1950s, was foreshadow-
ing what would happen one or two generations later in Europe is old. Long before 
anybody talked or wrote about globalisation, Daniel Bell (1953; 1976) noted that 
American labour unions were unable to set foot in the service sector and gain signifi-
cant membership among white-collar staff. From this, he and others drew the conclu-
sion that employment trends towards a post-industrial economy were bound to set 
limits to union growth and would eventually cause union decline. With attention to 
technological and cultural change and trends towards diversity within social classes, 
some sociologists predicted the disorganisation of the working class and the decline of 
economic interest organizations such as trade unions and employers’ associations 
(Lash/Urry 2000). Since the late 1980s globalisation became the new champion, or 
ghost, responsible for the international convergence towards union decline (see Ber-
ger/Dore 1996).
The general downward trend of union decline after the 1980s, albeit with large 
temporal differences, seemed to confirm such predictions. However, the continued 
and even increased divergence in unionization trends – mainly the case of the small 
and open economies of Northern Europe and of Germany until the 1990s 
(Golden/Wallerstein/Lange 2000) – belied any such global trend. The remarkable 
resilience of collective bargaining institutions in continental Western Europe was an-
other stubborn fact that could not be squared with the prediction of convergence on 
an Anglo-American pattern. 
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Longitudinal analysis and institutions 
Several authors have tried to explain longitudinal trends in union density (Chec-
chi/Visser 2005; Oskarsson 2001; Scruggs/Lange 2002; Western 1997). All these au-
thors use more or less the same data sources and econometric estimation methods, 
though they differ in the choice of countries, years and regressors. Western (1997) 
finds a significant role for cyclical variables (a negative impact on union growth of 
unemployment and a positive one for inflation) and a downward impact of labour 
force growth, presumably because of the entry of more people with weak labour mar-
ket attachments and a low propensity to unionize. He deals with the role of institu-
tions by partitioning the sample into countries with union-administrated unemploy-
ment insurance or the ‘Ghent’ system (like Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and to some 
extent Belgium) and finds that such institutions neutralise the negative drag of rising 
unemployment on union membership. He also finds that in the period considered 
(1950-85) union growth was stronger in countries with a left-of-centre government 
and centralized wage bargaining. Scruggs/Lange (2002) and Oskarsson (2001) explic-
itly study the impact of globalisation and absence of convergence. 
Examining the period until the late 1980s, Scruggs and Lange control for cyclical 
variation (GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, government partisanship) and struc-
tural change (public employment and labour force growth), but their main concern is 
with the impact of globalisation, which they measure by the share in GDP of foreign 
trade, foreign direct investment and financial liberalization. The authors deal with the 
institutional aspects by creating a single measure of ‘union compatible institutions’, 
which is the sum of three indicators – Ghent; workplace representation, and bargain-
ing centralisation – identified by Ebbinghaus/Visser (1999) in their qualitative com-
parative analysis of European unions as the institutional combination most favourable 
to union growth. This variable is then interacted with all regressors, leading to the 
conclusion that increased financial openness is associated with increasing density in 
countries with ‘union compatible institutions’, whereas it is detrimental to unions whe-
re these institutions are absent or weak. In similar fashion, Oskarsson proposes an 
‘institutional index’, which is the product of centralization and workplace representa-
tion summed to a dummy for ‘Ghent’. His central claim is that the combination of 
centralized bargaining and locally embedded trade unions can exert positive influence 
on the union density level even under conditions of globalisation (Oskarsson 2001).
Checchi/Visser (2005), finally, consider a longer time period and a larger variety 
of institutions including wage indexation, bargaining centralization, workplace repre-
sentation, and unemployment benefits, while allowing (slow) variation in these institu-
tions over time, and they explicitly distinguish between annual and periodic change. 
Their main finding was that union density rates declined because unemployment went 
up (but in ‘Ghent countries’ the relation was pro-cyclical), newcomers in the labour 
force were recruited into (flexible and service) jobs and (smaller) workplaces less cov-
ered by unions, inflation decreased, indexation clauses were dismantled and replace-
ment rates were lowered, contributing to a decline in the perceived need for and effec-
tiveness of unions. In separate tests for developments after the early 1980s, they find 
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that neither political variables, nor globalisation, measured as financial openness, have 
a significant effect on union growth or decline.
Institutional divergence – will it last? 
These and other studies – like Traxler (2006) on employer organization, and Trax-
ler/Blaschke/Kittel (2001) on collective bargaining patterns – amassed empirical sup-
port for the institutionalist divergence hypothesis, while rejecting the convergence 
hypothesis based on globalisation or technological change (as reflected in employment 
patterns). The question to be asked next, is whether the institutions favourable to 
unions can last? What makes their survival possible? This is in essence the question 
asked by Thelen/van Wijnbergen (2003).
The “varieties of capitalism” approach is based on a dichotomy of how the Ger-
man and the US economy are supposedly functioning and how each derives competi-
tive advantage from its combination of institutions (Hall/Soskice 2001). It is not clear 
whether strong trade unions are part of that combination, but bargaining coordination 
and employer organization certainly are (Soskice 1990). Scandinavia, the Benelux, 
Scandinavia, Austria, Switzerland, and Japan, are counted as “coordinated market 
economies” (Hall/Soskice 2001: 20). The comparatively low aggregate level of union 
organization in Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the Netherlands appears at first an 
anomaly, but the presence of centralising institutions offering coordination across the 
economy, like trendsetting wage bargaining in Germany, orchestration of annual wage 
campaigns in Japan, collective action of employers and referendums in Switzerland, or 
national social partnership in the Netherlands, might have compensated for union 
weakness. Moreover, in the German and Japanese case the strength of the unions in 
manufacturing and in the dominating exporting firms was notable and perhaps all that 
mattered for the ‘varieties of capitalism’ thesis.
Thelen and Wijnbergen present a more refined or dynamic analysis. Their starting 
point is that in a high-quality export economy industrial peace becomes the major 
concern for large employers. If push comes to shove it will be prioritized over the 
goal of wage moderation. As a consequence, an organization like Gesamtmetall was in 
the late 1990s no longer able to meet union strike threats and this led to settlements 
that many firms could not sustain, prompting their defection. This ‘weakness’ of em-
ployer organisation is not a ‘strength’ of unions, as it may seem at first sight, but rather 
exposes the unions to a strategic dilemma between short-term wage gains and long-
term erosion of sectoral bargaining and representation.
Thelen and Wijnbergen offer two specific reasons why this problem is more pro-
nounced in Germany than in other co-ordinated economies, like for instance the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden or Austria. Centrifugal tendencies, they 
argue, will be stronger if membership in the employers’ association is very heteroge-
neous, especially with regard to firm size. Tensions within employers’ associations 
related to firm size and the differing ability to sustain sectoral agreements seem to 
have increased in many countries (see the accounts on Sweden, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands in Grote et al. (2006), but they are particularly pronounced in Germany. 
Of the countries mentioned above, Germany is the only large one. When bargaining 
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units are very large7 and include large and small firms with sharply different abilities to 
pay, the pressure to break up agreements in smaller or more differentiated units is 
bound to rise. This pressure should be larger in large than in small countries, given the 
increase in heterogeneity and regional variation. If decentralisation or differentiation is 
blocked and if it is impossible to make bargaining units smaller for a larger range of 
issues, employers with the lowest capacity to sustain the costs of sectoral agreements 
will withdraw and coverage decreases. Tendencies to defect from employers’ associa-
tions were much less present among the smaller neighbours, but even there — espe-
cially in Denmark and the Netherlands — employers insisted on, and unions con-
ceded, further decentralisation and differentiation of agreements, allowing agreements 
on wages and company social policy to diverge within sectors (Visser 2005).
 Among the large economies Germany is the only one with a continued (post-
war) history of sectoral wage bargaining. In the USA, Canada, Japan and since the 
1970s in the UK, wages in the private sector are set at company level, with a residual 
role for statutory minimum wages in some cases. Much the same can be argued for 
the case of France, though here the role of the statutory minimum wage and of state 
intervention is much more pervasive, with many sectoral agreements only following 
and sometimes falling behind ministerial decisions. In response to the Maastricht con-
vergence criteria and preparing for participation in the Economic and Monetary Un-
ion, Italy has redefined a new role for sectoral bargaining in the 1990s within a multi-
level system with productivity-oriented wage bargaining in large firms. However, in 
Italy additional flexibility is guaranteed through the vast empire of small firms and 
informal employment to which much lower standards of protection apply.
The second reason why the German system is particularly exposed to centrifugal 
pressures is, according to Thelen and Wijnbergen, due to the absence of state media-
tion or arbitration of conflict in Germany. With the demise of the lockouts as the 
deterrent of aggressive union wage pressure, Tarifautonomie may have become a handi-
cap. This is how things are perceived in Sweden, with an economy and industrial rela-
tions system in many ways similar to Germany. Responding to repeated threats of the 
state to impose statutory mediation, Swedish unions and employers in industry agreed 
in 1997 to set up their own mediation procedures and joint economic forecasting 
institute (Elvander 1999). Note that parliamentary and state intervention in the ending 
of strikes has been common in Denmark and Norway and that in Belgium the law sets 
a maximum to wage increases. In the Netherlands and Austria social partnership set 
strong limits of self-restraint on the behaviour of unions and employers, both at the 
national and sectoral level. The recent history of German industrial relations points to 
the dangers of a combination of a weak (federal) state, encumbered by many veto 
positions, and strong organized interests which tend to defend their autonomy 
(Streeck 2003).
The combined heterogeneity and autonomy hypotheses of Thelen and van 
Wijnbergen give a plausible account of the negative dynamic in which German em-
                                                          
7  Industry bargaining in Germany takes place at the regional level, but agreements are high-
ly patterned. Contractual rates in the Eastern states are lower than the national average, 
but differences have narrowed, as has been a consistent union objective since 1989. 
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ployers’ associations and trade unions got caught in the 1990s. Surely, it is a hypothe-
sis — its testing requires time series data on firm heterogeneity, export shares of firm 
sales, wages (or wage costs), and membership in employers’ associations and unions in 
different sectors in Germany and some other countries, if possible.
Can current trends of union decline be reversed?
In this third and final section, I shall consider the possibilities and difficulties of a 
trend reversal. Unions can respond differently to strategic dilemmas like the one de-
scribe before. The Pforzheim agreement of 2004 in the metal engineering sector may 
be interpreted as an attempt to stop the erosion of sectoral organization and bargain-
ing by allowing more ‘organised decentralisation’ and flexibility at company level, fol-
lowing similar choices made by the neighbours (Visser 2005). Usually, there is a defeat, 
like the failed IG Metall strike over shorter working hours in Eastern Germany in June 
2003, which make such policy changes possible. In this section I shall first discuss the 
nature of the difficulties of a trend reversal and than review some policy responses. 
Employment growth in a declining 3M world
Table 1 showed that in some countries — Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, Italy, 
Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands (until the recession of 2002-3) — trade unions have 
managed to attract more members, often after many years of decline. These countries 
share the experience of strong employment growth. Job growth tends to be a neces-
sary condition for union growth: after 1990 there are no countries with employment 
stagnation or job decline and an absolute rise in union membership, in fact it is the 
decline in employment growth that is behind the end to union membership growth in 
countries like Sweden and Finland. But it is not a sufficient condition. There are other 
countries with strong increases in employment during the 1990s and beyond – the 
USA and the UK among them – where unions nonetheless failed to stop or reverse 
negative membership trends.8
Under conditions of strong job growth, union membership increases may not 
translate in a rise in union density. In fact, in recent years aggregate union density rates 
in Canada, New Zealand, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands fell, or stayed just 
about level, in spite of membership growth. The expansion of employment is nowa-
days a matter of service jobs, flexible contracts and female employment. Unions come 
from a different world — the world of the 3 Ms of Manufacturing, Manual, and Male.
In developed economies the 3M world has become a minority. On average, three 
out of four employees now work in services. Within manufacturing, manual workers 
have become a minority and an ageing one. In the past twenty years, the share of wo-
men in paid employment and people working part-time has doubled. Non-standard 
employment contracts (fixed-term, work agencies, casual and variable hours, the de-
pendent self-employed) are on the rise – to some 15-25 percent in the European Un-
ion. With some exceptions, mainly found in Scandinavia to which some examples in 
Northern Italy may be added, trade unions in Europe and elsewhere have had little 
                                                          
8  The total membership in trade unions in the UK increased in 1999 and 2000 for the first 
time in two decades, but from 2001 the decline continued (Granger 2006: 11).
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success with recruiting outside their traditional strongholds, they do poorly among 
immigrants and people with non-standard employment contracts, and they appear to 
be losing the connection with the world of young workers.
In France the probabilities of a worker to join a union are five to six times higher 
in public sector employment compared to the private sector; in the US the difference 
is a factor of four to five, in the UK three to four, in Germany and the Netherlands 
two to three. In Sweden the difference is only marginal (Visser 2006). The weaker the 
trade unions are – as measured by low aggregate union density rates – the more they 
tend to be dominated by workers in large manufacturing firms and by public sector 
employees. As a consequence, unions tend to represent workers in relatively protected 
employment positions. In continental Europe, Japan and Korea, employment repre-
sentation rights and dismissal protection above rights guaranteed by the law are 
strongly correlated with firm size and public sector employment.
The new world: young, female and white collar 
Table 2 shows the estimated union density rates by gender, age, sector and occupation 
for a number of European countries. These estimates are based on the 2002/3 wave 
of European Social Survey (ESS) and need to be interpreted with caution. Although 
they represent the best comparative survey statistics to date based on well-designed 
samples and questionnaires, samples are small and questions about union membership 
may have been misunderstood leading to under- or over-reporting as the case may be. 
The estimates based on these surveys are therefore are best seen as midpoints within 
relatively wide confidence intervals. Nonetheless, some general conclusions may be 
drawn from these results.
Firstly, in the past twenty years the male-female gap in unionisation has disap-
peared in Scandinavia and the UK. Estimates from much larger labour force surveys 
and administrative records show higher unionisation rates for females in Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland, and equal rates in the UK (Visser 2006). In the UK case this 
equalisation trend is driven by the sharp fall in male unionization related to the decline 
in manufacturing. In Scandinavia the narrowing of the male-female gap is driven by a 
pattern of job segregation, which attracts women disproportionably to public sector 
jobs and to professions in education, health and social services that tend to be more 
prone to unionisation. The dominance of public sector employment in combination 
with an “adult worker model” of full-time earning women (Lewis 2002) which is tradi-
tionally found in the planned economies of East Central Europe, though now fading 
and under severe pressure, may explain why unionisation rates in these countries tend 
to be higher for women than for men. It is of interest to note that in Eastern Ger-
many in 1992 union density rates were higher for women (43.5 percent) than for men 
(35.8 percent). In just over a decade these density rates for both women and men have 
halved to 20.0 percent for women and 16.8 percent for men in 2004,9 still with a slight 
advantage for women, in line with what we observe elsewhere in ECE.
                                                          
9  Estimates based on ALLBUS surveys, as rendered in Schnabel and Wagner, 2007.  
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Table 2:  Trade Union densities by gender, age, sector and occupation 
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Despite the convergence of female employment patterns in Eastern and Western 
Germany towards a part-time earner-care model (Rosenfeld/Trappe/Gornick 2004) 
and despite convergent trends in unionisation in the two parts of Germany (Schna-
bel/Wagner 2003), a large difference in the female-male unionisation gap has persisted 
in the West. In Western Germany, the 2004 density rate for women is 15.8 percent 
compared to 26.3 percent for men, down from 18.5 percent (women) and 36.0 per-
cent (men) in 1992 and 20.3 percent (women) and 39.6 percent (men) in 1980 (Schna-
bel/Wagner, 2007). In other words, the female/male gap in unionisation in Western 
Germany has hardly changed in these twenty years and the massive fall in union 
membership among male workers (in industry) has not been compensated by the re-
cruitment of female employees (in services).
In this respect, Dutch unions did a better job. Starting from a very low point, 
female membership in the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions jumped with 160 
percent from 132,700 in 1985 to 346,800 in 1998, whereas male membership 
increased with 16 percent from 760,900 to 883,500 (Ebbinghaus/Visser, 2000: 495). 
FNV net density stagnated around 14.5 per cent for men ad increased from 6.3 to 9.8 
per cent for women (idem, 497). DGB unions achieved no rise in female density 
between 1985 and 1997, which stayed around 14 percent, whereas male density 
decreased from 25.8 to 19.7 percent (idem, 332). With some justification, one former 
president of the FNV claimed that women rescued Dutch unions.10
Table 2 corroborates the finding reported in the literature based on ISSP surveys 
(Blanchflower 1996), that the young are underrepresented in today’s trade unions. 
German unions have a particularly large deficit in attracting young people, though east 
of the border unions do decidedly worse. In the IG Metall, between 1998 and 2002 44 
percent of the new entrants came from apprenticeships, but this share has since de-
creased to 39 percent or lower. Even in Scandinavia, there are signs that young people 
are disenchanted with the unions. Combined with the finding, based on a Dutch study 
of patterns of joining behaviour that people tend to join union early on in their work-
ing life or not at all (van Rij 1994), the decline in the recruitment of the young predicts 
lower future union growth. Unions are struggling against a negative demographic 
trend. The IG Metall loses every year 25,000 members because of death and there are 
less young recruits to replace them. 
Finally, the data in Table 2 show that most unions have difficulties organizing the 
vast, heterogeneous and growing world of services. In this regard, German unions are 
as unsuccessful as Dutch unions. In both countries, there is clearly a problem with 
building up the “critical mass” of union organizing in commercial and business ser-
                                                          
10  The Dutch union density rate among females in 1980 was one of the lowest (16,2 per-
cent) in Western Europe and the female/male gap one of the largest (0.389). Today, most 
women work part-time and part-time workers are less unionised than full-time workers, 
especially when working in mini-jobs. Estimates from the Netherlands Labour Force Sur-
vey (Enquête Beroepsbevolking) of 2004 show that density rates vary from 27 percent for 
those working 35 hours or more weekly, to 23 percent (20-34 hours) and 12 percent (12-
19 hours), and from 27 percent of workers with standard employment contracts to 11 
percent of temporary worksers (www.cbs.nl/statline, approached 05/01/2007).
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vices. This is confirmed by the differences in unionisation between skilled manual and 
white-collar workers, excluding those in managerial and higher professional positions. 
According to the estimates based on the ESS, these differences are larger in the Neth-
erlands and Germany than anywhere else. Of course, these findings have to be read 
with caution and will become more telling when future waves of the EES re-affirm 
these differentials and allow us to observe trends over time. As they stand, however, 
they allow us to picture some of the comparative weaknesses of Germany’s trade un-
ions.
A “first loser advantage”? 
A hypothesis that needs further exploration is that the more their membership is 
skewed towards large manufacturing firms and the public sector, the more difficult it 
is for unions to make the transition to the service economy and support policies that 
promote job growth and recruitment of women and employees in small firms. In his 
article about “the snakes and ladders of trade unions”, Crouch suggests that the past 
strength of German unions may have become a handicap, when it comes “at the ex-
pense of falling into the trap (...) of coming to represent an ostensibly privileged group 
of labour-market insiders to the possible cost of various groups of outsiders” (Crouch 
2000: 81). In one of their hypotheses Thelen/van Wijnbergen (2003: 87) propose that 
centrifugal pressures, or the difficulty to define common bargaining strategies, on the 
union side will be much stronger in countries where union organization is dispropor-
tionably concentrated in the core firms, which are conflict-adverse and willing and 
able to pay a high price for labour peace. A comparison between unions in Sweden 
and Denmark, or between those in Germany and the Netherlands, should shed light 
on this.
I cannot do that here, but one possible explanation why German unions have 
more difficulties in adjusting to change may reside, paradoxically, in the fact that they 
were so long able to boost a strong and successful economy based on manufacturing 
and exports, with a vital role for themselves. Perhaps there exists something like “a 
first loser advantage”, of early losses forcing rapid learning and adjustment when 
sharp differences between insiders and outsiders are not yet settled. Behind the Dutch 
miracle and the support of the Dutch unions for a strategy of job growth based part-
time employment for women lies their defeat to defend wages, employment and 
membership based on the male breadwinner model of the past (Visser/Hemerijck, 
1997). Moreover, only after all major affiliates of the Dutch Federation of Trade Un-
ions (FNV) began to loose members between 1980 and 1986, they were prepared to 
participate in a joint plan of action to reverse negative trends and invest, among oth-
ers, in the recruitment of women and part-time workers. As predicted by Steekelen-
burg, FNV president from 1988-1996, this extraordinary degree of joint action would 
end as soon as some key (public sector) unions made again membership gains.11
                                                          
11  The FNV 2000 plan, adopted as a basis for policy in 1986, proposed union mergers and 
joint union action with regard to the recruitment of (part-time working) women, service 
workers, immigrants and young people, and included the improvement of statistical analy-
sis of membership trends, increased use of ICT, surveys of members and non-members 
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Maintaining a social norm of membership and the persistence of decline
Workers join unions because they want something that they cannot readily get on 
their own: better wages and working conditions, social protection, job security, de-
fence against arbitrary decisions of management. Another reason for membership is 
social belonging, the desire to be part and earn the respect of the group. This mixture 
of instrumental and social reasons is time and again reported in surveys in which 
members report why they joined. However, since many things that unions achieve are 
‘collective goods’ from which non-members also benefit, unions are exposed to the 
threat of free-riding behaviour (Olson 1965; Crouch 1982).
It is for trade unions, therefore, not enough to be efficient and effective in deliv-
ering the goods and services that members want. They must also create and maintain a 
social norm of membership. In addition, unions can try to create ‘loyal’ members, and 
prevent defection, through ‘selective’ benefits that accrue only or more favourably to 
members. Union administrated unemployment insurance modelled on the ‘Ghent 
system’ is an example. Other examples include favourable treatment of members in 
union or works council negotiated social plans in case of company restructuring (used 
in Denmark and the Netherlands), the return of contributions and specific benefits for 
members related to membership tenure (used in Belgium), or special training pro-
grams for members (used by all unions). There are some interesting examples of such 
attempts to discourage free riding in Germany as well, for instance in IG Metall in
North-Rhineland-Westphalia. However, the literature on this subject suggests that 
such selective benefits are most effective when unions are embedded socially and 
there is also a social norm of membership.
In social custom theory compliance with such a norm derives from a reputation 
effect (Booth 1985). People stick to the norm because they believe in the purpose of 
unionism and they do not want to loose their reputation as a good fellow in the group. 
This implies that the ‘membership norm’ strongly depends on two conditions: the 
overall standing and prestige of unions in society (are they perceived and portrayed as 
effective or ineffective, is their reputation one to defend general worker interests or 
only insiders?) and the embeddedness of the union in the local situation, the work-
place or local community. Italy, for instance, offers interesting examples of the latter, 
especially in the small towns of Middle Italy. In a sense, obedience with the norm 
depends on how many others in one’s environment are union members and prepared 
to be open and positive about it. A favourable political and legal climate and the ab-
sence of employer harassment do help as well. Another application of this approach 
was offered by Goerke/Pannenberg (2004) for Germany. Using panel data, they 
found empirical evidence for norm-based union membership, in which conformity 
with the norm and willingness to join a union varies with union density. 
                                                          
and their demand for and evaluation of union policies and services. This approach was 
shelved in the mid-1990s when membership decline was no longer a problem for some 
unions and others became overwhelmed by post-merger problems. (The author was as 
advisor involved in the preparation of FNV-2000.)
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It has been demonstrated that voluntary (‘open-shop’) unionism can exist at vari-
ous levels of union density despite employer opposition and a potential free-rider 
threat (Naylor 1990). However, as shown by Booth/Chatterji (1993) in the case of 
Britain, there is a minimum level of union density (10%? 20%?) below which reputa-
tion effects will not work. In a situation where the norm is that of the self-made man 
and unions are associated with the old economy, one’s reputation may even suffer 
from joining a union. There is anecdotic evidence that this the case in the ICT sector 
in the Netherlands. Another example is that many union members in commercial staff 
functions in Dutch banks kept their membership secret, not just for fear of manage-
ment retaliation. Surely, unions always depended on people who were prepared to 
stick their necks out, but mass unionism is not built on heroes only.
Social custom theory helps to explain the intriguing fact of diverging unionisation 
trends across countries in spite of common challenges and shocks in the union’s envi-
ronment. Where union density is lower, the effectiveness of unions and reputation 
losses from non-membership will be weaker; fewer workers will be attracted, which in 
turn undermines the belief in the union needed for observance of the norm among 
new recruits or in the next generation. A further implication is that a reduction in 
union membership caused by a temporary shock (like unification and the sharp rise in 
unemployment in Germany in the 1990s or one decade earlier the collapse of major 
manufacturing sectors in Britain and the Netherlands) is likely to be persistent and that 
rebuilding the unions to their previous strength will be very difficult as it can no lon-
ger draw as much as in the past on social pressure.
What should German unions do? 
The preceding analysis implies that, in the German case, a return to the unionization 
levels of before 1989 is unlikely. Even maintaining present levels will require a consid-
erable joint effort of German unions and a policy at all three levels distinguished be-
fore: an improvement of the standing or prestige of unions nationally, cleverly de-
signed selective incentives (related to training and improving members’ employability), 
and strengthening the unions in the workplace and in the community. In view of the 
fact that many professional and skilled worker are employed in networks rather than 
in fixed locations and that there is a growing flexible workforce with short tenure or 
part-time jobs, the local community becomes more rather than less important for 
unions.
Joel Rogers argues in A Strategy for Labor: “Unions advance when they put for-
ward practical programs of action that (a) benefit their members or potential mem-
bers; (b) solve problems in the broader society – often, problems for capitalists, on 
whose well-being the rest of society unfortunately depends; and (c) by doing both 
these things achieve the political cache and social respect – as carriers of the ‘general 
interest’ – needed to secure supports for their own organization” (Rogers 1995: 381). 
Any union revival strategy should begin with an analysis what those problems in the 
broader society are.
In the 1980s, the relatively stability of German unions and collective bargaining 
institutions suggested that unions could sustain their strength in spite of globalisation, 
the shift to services, restructuring and rising unemployment, if they are capable of 
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making a productive contribution, by simultaneously preventing firms to follow a low-
wage adjustment path and by helping management to raise functional flexibility of 
internal labour markets in pursuit of quality competition (Streeck 1992). This may 
have distinguished German and Swedish developments before the 1990s, compared to 
the rapid demise of unions in the US and UK and the deep crises in France or the 
Netherlands. The proximate cause of the collapse of sectoral bargaining in the UK 
was the massive withdrawal of employers. Given the “low degree of control and an 
unrealistically narrow scope” (Brown 1993: 190), sectoral agreements did nothing for 
them and abandoning sectoral bargaining was therefore a relatively costless option for 
employers. The outcome of the German story may still be different.
Germany’s trade unions seem to have missed the two “ladders” or rescue strate-
gies that unions in Ireland, the Netherlands or Denmark used with some success dur-
ing the 1990s. These strategies consisted in developing a strategy of “organized decen-
tralisation”, with more choice for firms and workers; a new agenda for the post-
industrial economy confronting issues of gender and work-family related stress; and 
the promotion and management of welfare state and labour market reform based on 
partnership and so-called new social pacts.
On firm-level flexibility German unions may be better than their reputation, but 
it is the latter that counts. With the Pforzheim agreement of 2004 the IG Metall seems 
to have moved in the direction of organized decentralization, like the chemicals union. 
With regard to the second strategy – addressing the problems and developing a union 
agenda for the new world of women, youth and services – German unions have drag-
ged their feet and are now far behind developments in Scandinavia and Anglo-
American unions. The statistics discussed in the previous sections confirm the analysis 
of Behrens et al. who in their review of several union revitalization strategies found 
little that suggested strategic priorities or a deep concern for structural change. Their 
conclusion is that German unions “have not yet succeeded in radically rethinking their 
organizing strategies” (Behrens/Fichter/Frege 2003: 28).
Finally, one of the major reasons for the failure of the ‘Alliance for Jobs, Training 
and Competitiveness’ was the unwillingness of German unions to make compromises 
on labour market and welfare reform. Scholars have attributed this to the strong sec-
ondary power resources embodied in sectoral corporatist institutions of German un-
ions (Traxler/Blaschke/Kittel 2001; Siegel 2004), and to the social insurance institu-
tions that long concealed the costs of high unemployment for unions and those in 
stable employment (Hassel, 2003). Lack of preparation and Tarifautonomie prevented 
the state from casting a “shadow of hierarchy” over the bargaining table in the pri-
mary domain of union wage bargaining, while key employers prioritised social peace. 
If union could not convince themselves to follow a modernisation strategy, nobody 
else could. The next thing was that the unions found themselves sidelined and politi-
cally isolated. 
Partnership with employers is not a panacea for all problems that unions have. 
For unions it is rather a tightrope, but one that must be walked. John Monks, General-
Secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) bemoans that “New Capi-
talism” tends to destroy the social nexus between worker and employer and the broad 
employment rights and social obligations that since Industrial Revolution had been 
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built on that nexus. “We may not have always liked it but we knew where we were 
with the Ford Motor Company. Goldman Sachs by contrast is foreign land and hedge 
funds are in a different universe. We won’t achieve anything by cuddling up to 
them....”.12 Nor will they by ignoring the world of New Capitalism or failing to engage. 
Taking on worldwide financial capital requires broad international and European coa-
litions, partnerships with governments and with producers in the real economy, and 
membership strength, which in the final analysis is the basis for union pressure.
This brings us back to my initial question. Can German unions turn around the 
decline in membership? In my view, the answer must begin with a dispassionate analy-
sis of the manifold reasons of the decline, some of which I have tried to identify in 
this paper. Next, if unions want to reverse trends membership recruitment should be 
made into a “Chefsache” and deemed a strategic priority. There is no “magic bullet” 
and regaining membership will never come from just one ‘stand alone’ policy and it 
will not come quick. Membership growth, even of modest proportions, will require a 
mixture of a long-term political strategy towards employers and governments, job 
growth, the building of supporting institutions, finding concrete measures to limit free 
riding behaviour, paying constant attention to the membership issue at all levels of 
union organisation, finding new forms of membership, perhaps not all offering the 
same package of rights and obligations, as well as new ways of communication with 
both members, aspiring members and non-members. Given the size and the nature of 
the Germany economy, the strength and orientation of German unions has always 
been vital for other European unions and for European industrial relations. They are 
still largest in absolute numbers. If German unions continue their decline or remain in 
a state of denial of the new world we have entered, this is bad news for their Euro-
pean friends. 
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